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Chief Justice O'CONNOR delivered the judgment of the 
Court and an opinion joined by Justices REHNQUIST, 
THOMAS, and KENNEDY, and by Justice SCALIA except for 
footnote 1. 
[The Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., prohibits 
firearms dealers from selling handguns to any person under 21, 
to anyone not resident in the dealer's state, to convicted felons, 
and to certain others. In 1993, the Brady Act (passed after an 
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the President) amended the 
statute, imposing a system of "interim" background checks for 
purchasers before a system of instant electronic checks goes into 
effect. The Brady Act requires a "chief law enforcement offi-
cer" to make a "reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business 
days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the 
law." Printz, a local sheriff, refused to comply with the statute, 
and the Attorney General obtained a federal injunction requir-
ing him to do so. When Printz refused to obey the injunction, he 
was convicted of criminal contempt and received a three-month 
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Univer-
sity of Minnesota. 
** Historical Note. As indicated in Justice Scalia's concurrence in Printz, the "out 
of control" state judiciary had become a major conservative agenda issue by 1980. Con-
sequently, President Reagan's appointments to the Court were picked at least partly on 
the basis of their nationalist credentials. Indeed, some argued that rejection of Tarble's 
was being applied as a litmus test. Although Reagan very nearly selected the more na-
tionalist William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, he apparently concluded that O'Connor, 
with her background as a state court judge and legislator, would be more palatable to 
moderates. Undoubtedly, her selection as Chief Justice helped defuse some opposition 
to the Supreme Court's attack on states' rights. 
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sentence. He thereupon filed a petition in state court for a writ 
of habeas corpus, which the state courts granted.] 
The state courts held that the Brady Act violates the Tenth 
Amendment and the guaranty clause of the Constitution. We 
reverse without reaching the merits of this claim. Printz relies on 
Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), as the basis for state 
court jurisdiction. It is true that this Court held in Tarble's Case 
that state courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of 
federal custody- in that case itself, into whether the ~etitioner 
was unlawfully enlisted into the Army while a minor. We do 
not have occasion to question that holding today, though it has 
been severely criticized by commentators and has been eroded 
by recent decisions of this Court. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's 
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 459-461 (4th ed. 
1996). 
Nevertheless, on the facts of this case, it is clear that the 
state courts lacked jurisdiction. Inasmuch as Printz is seeking an 
unprecedented expansion of an existing constitutional rule, his 
habeas petition is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
Teague squarely held that a habeas court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider a "new rule" of constitutional law. This is just such a 
case.2 
The sweeping interpretation of the Tenth Amendment 
sought by Printz would unquestionably be a "new rule" under 
Teague. The lower courts relied largely on our holding in New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). But as both the plu-
I. The key passage in Chief Justice Chase's opinion for the Court reads as follows: 
To deny the right of State courts to issue the writ, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, to concede the right to issue and to deny the right to adjudicate, is to deny 
the right to protect the citizen by habeas corpus against arbitrary imprisonment 
in a large class of cases; and, we arc thoroughly persuaded, was never within the 
contemplation of the Convention which framed, or the people who adopted, the 
Constitution. That instrument expressly declares that "the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion or in· 
vasion, the public safety may require it." 
There is some historical evidence that Chase's opinion was originally drafted as a dissent. 
2. Unlike Teague, this case involves state rather than federal habeas. Neverthe· 
less, Teague rests on the understanding that "[a)pplication of constitutional rule not in 
existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of fi-
nality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." 489 U.S. at 309. 
That rationale is fully applicable when a federal conviction is involved, just as it is when a 
state conviction is under collateral attack. The same is true for Teague's warning about 
the "harm caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants alike," id. at 315, if 
the rule were to be nonretroactive except in the specific case in which this Court or any 
lower court, state or federal, first announces a new rule of federal law. 
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rality opinion by Justice Stevens and the concurring opinion of 
Justice White make clear, New York stands at most for the prin-
ciple that Congress lacks the power to commandeer state legisla-
tures. It would be an extraordinary expansion of New York to 
extend this principle to state executive officers, particularly in 
the face of substantial evidence that the Framers intended the 
state executives to play a central role in enforcing federal law. 
See Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 
1957 (1993). 
It surely "would not have been an illogical or even a grudg-
ing application" of prior law "to decide that it did not extend to 
the facts" of this case. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981).3 That being true, Teague blocks the use of state collat-
eral review. 
Consequently, the judgment of the lower court is reversed 
and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion. 
Justice SCALIA concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment. 
* * * Power. That is what this suit is about. The allocation 
of power among the federal government and the state courts in 
such a fashion as to preserve the equilibrium the Constitution 
sought to establish. Frequently, an issue of this sort will come 
before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the poten-
tial of a novel principle to undermine the equilibrium of power is 
not apparent and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive 
analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf. 
Indeed, this is a wolf that has come before, time and again. 
Fortunately, the decision in Tarble's Case itself came too late to 
affect the course of the civil war. But only a few decades later, it 
began to prove its ability to upset the balance of federalism. By 
the late 19th Century, labor-oriented state courts were routinely 
granting habeas to union leaders jailed for contempt of federal 
injunctions. By the middle of the next century, Congress was 
finding it difficult to conduct investigations of serious threats to 
3. It is true that we have suggested an exception to Teague where the petitioner's 
"primary conduct" is immune from government regulation. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302 (1989). Here, however, the conduct was contempt of a federal injunction, 
which arguably does not qualify as "primary" conduct at all since it took place in the 
course of litigation, and in any event is not in itself conduct outside the scope of govern-
ment regulation, whatever the underlying validity of the injunction. 
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our national security, as its contempt orders were met with state 
habeas writs issued by judges whose motivations themselves 
were, in the eyes of many, suspect. True, those writs were gen-
erally reversed by this Court, but not until much valuable time 
had been wasted. But worse was to follow. Although previous 
war efforts had been too popular to meet resistance from the 
state courts, the Vietnam War was different. By 1968, a flurry of 
state habeas petitions had begun to interfere seriously with con-
scription. Several state trial judges held that the war was uncon-
stitutional. These rulings sparked mass demonstrations that led 
to the 1969 Paris peace talks, which brought the war to an igno-
minious end before any of the state decisions reached this Court 
for review.4 More recently, some state courts have applied un-
duly expansive views of the Bill of Rights to overturn federal 
criminal convictions, with (sad to say) support from members of 
this Court. See William Brennan, State Courts and the Protection 
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535 (1986). Again, the 
power of this Court to review the state judgments proved in 
practice inadequate as a safeguard. It is little wonder that state 
habeas-and the banner of "states' rights" more generally-has 
become the darling of certain political forces within our society, 
who are unable to muster nationwide majorities for their pre-
ferred political positions.5 
The dissent has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a jurisdictional 
spat. At root, the dispute is between those favoring the orderly 
national resolution of political or legal disputes, versus those 
who favor an anarchistic riot of local self-determination. The 
majority opinion is not the manifestation of a "bare desire tore-
strict constitutional rights" but is rather a modest attempt to pre-
serve national judicial power against the efforts of a locally pow-
4. As this history shows, the ultimate ability of this Court to review aberrant state 
decisions is cold comfort indeed, particularly given the docket constraints that make it 
impossible for us to hear more than a fraction of the cases in which review is granted. 
5. Some have even traced Tarble's back to pre-Civil War cases in which state 
courts granted habeas to fugitive slaves held in federal custody. See Robert M. Cover, 
Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (Yale U. Press, 1975). Such com-
mentators might have found the rule in Tarble's Case a good deal less acceptable, how-
ever, had it not been for our decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which 
brought an early end to the use of state courts to block federal desegregation decrees. 
Cooper recognized an exception to state habeas jurisdiction in cases where the federal 
government was acting pursuant to its powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, on 
the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment revised the otherwise applicable structure 
of federalism and that allowing state interference with federal enforcement of the Four-
teenth Amendment would conflict with the policy underlying Tarble's, which was in-
tended to protect individual rights through state enforcement, not undermine federal 
enforcement of those rights. 
1999] SYMPOSIUM: FARBER 521 
erful majority to undermine that authority through use of the 
state courts. 
Under the dissent's view, it would now be open season upon 
the enforcement powers of the federal courts. The dissent essen-
tially says to the federal government: "Trust the state courts. 
They will make sure that you are able to accomplish your consti-
tutional role." I think that the Constitution gives the federal 
government-and the people-more protection than that. It is 
time to overrule Tarble's Case and bring this sorry aspect of our 
nation's history to an end. 
Justice STEVENS, joined by Justice SOUTER, Justice 
GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER, dissenting. 
Poor Printz! 
Deprived of his liberty by a federal court enforcing an un-
constitutional federal statute, yet with no place to turn for relief 
but the same federal courts that issued the injunction-courts 
largely manned by judges appointed by the same President and 
Congress that passed the law in question. 
Unfortunately, the majority turns its back on established 
case law and would erect a formidable new barrier to relief. 
From the majority's exposition, one might infer that its novel 
fabrication will work no great change in the availability of state 
habeas. Nothing could be further from the truth. The state 
courts are a bulwark of our liberties, as one leading scholar has 
aptly observed. See Akhil Amar, Using State Law to Protect 
Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions and Answers 
About Converse-1983, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 159 (1993). Until to-
day, no question has ever been raised about the power of the 
state courts to intervene when Congress oversteps its constitu-
tional powers. But why then, we must ask, did the Supremacy 
Clause specifically impose the duty of applying the Constitution 
on state judges? For make no mistake: however clear our own 
power of judicial review may be, that power is only implied from 
the overall structure of the Constitution. But the mandate to the 
state courts is explicit and undeniable. 
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Our 
Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of 
Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent 
succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitu-
tion's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must sur-
vive more ages than one. We must accept our responsibility not 
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to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in 
light of all of our precedents. Today, the Court again sadly fails 
to protect the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own 
promise, the promise of liberty, protected by the state judiciary 
as well as by this Court itself. 
We respectfully dissent. 
